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Causation and Liability in Private Actions
For Proxy Violations
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,' the Supreme Court dealt with
shareholder recovery for management violations of the federal proxy
rules.2 The Court held that, when management needs shareholder votes
to effect a transaction, proof of a materially defective proxy statement3
is sufficient to show a causal relation between violation and transac-
tion. The Court did not, however, consider the question of whether
a causal relation sufficient to justify liability could exist between a
proxy violation and shareholder injury when management controls
enough votes to approve the action upon which the shareholders are
voting. Even when management controls, injury can be inflicted on
the corporation and its shareholders, and a causal relation can exist
between the proxy violation and the injury, since the concept of causa-
tion in a legal sense is not coextensive with simple voting power. This
Note will consider the ways in which deceptive proxy statements may
deprive minority shareholders of legal remedies or the use of publicity
and thus preclude those shareholders from cutting monetary losses or
from attempting to prevent completion of the injurious transaction.
1. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
2. Proxy statements are sent out by management in connection with a variety of
projected corporate actions: mergers, elections of directors, and sales of assets, for example.
The purpose of a proxy statement is to apprise the shareholder that certain action is
being considered and to provide sufficient information for him to register his informed
approval or disapproval. Deceptive practices led to federal regulation of many proxy
solicitations in 1934, and Section 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1964), of the Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1964), now prohibits the solicitation of proxies in contravention
of the rules and regulations issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section
14(a) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
security) registered pursuant to Section 78(1) of this title.
3. The S.E.C. is empowered to make rules by Section 23(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1964). The current rules may be found at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 et seq. (1970). Rule 14a-9,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1970), reads in part:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral,
containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances
under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or
which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier
communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or
subject matter which has become false or misleading.
In regard to the application of the proxy rules, see note 42 infra.
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In those management control situations in which minority sharehold-
ers were injured by a materially defective statement or in which cor-
rective actions were precluded, management should be liable.
I. Causation and the Courts
In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,4 the initial Supreme Court decision on the
existence of a private right of action for proxy violations,6 the Court
held that both derivative and direct suits could be maintained for viola-
tions of Section 14(a) and rules thereunder,7 that jurisdiction could be
founded on Section 27 of the 1934 Act,8 that retrospective relief might
be granted, 9 and that federal law should control the measure of such re-
lief.10 The decision was intended to implement the goals of the Act by
insuring fair corporate suffrage and protecting investors.1' The Court
stressed that private enforcement of the proxy rules "provides a neces-
sary supplement to Commission action" because of the volume of proxy
statements handled by the Securities and Exchange Commission and
its inability to examine each case with care.' 2 The decision hinted that
4. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
5. Even prior to Borak, some lower federal courts recognized the existence of a private
right of action. See, e.g., Rosen v. Alleghany Corp., 133 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (plain-
tiffs had standing); Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (conditions not satis-
fied for preliminary injunction; dictum that plaintiffs might later have election set aside);
Textron, Inc. v. American Woolen Co., 122 F. Supp. 305 (D. Mass. 1964) (dictum that pri-
vate party may complain of proxy violations); Phillips v. United Corp., [1945-47 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. Ra_'. 90,395 at 91,066 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (dictum that plaintiff
had right to sue, but held that he had not shown violation); United Industrial Corp. v.
Henwood, [1961-64 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 91,142 at 93,753 (S.D. Cal.
1962) (decree invalidating proxies, and injunction against further false and misleading
statements), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Henwood v. United Industrial Corp., 9th
Cir., Oct. 25, 1962; Kauder v. United Board & Carton Corp., 199 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (motion for preliminary injunction denied, but plaintiff did have standing); and cases
prior to 1965 cited in notes 56-57 infra.
6. In Borak plaintiff, a stockholder of J.L Case Co., initially sought an injunction
against the proposed merger of Case and the American Tractor Corp. The injunction
was denied. After the merger was consummated, plaintiff filed an amended complaint,
alleging, inter alia, that the merger was effected through the circulation of a false and
misleading proxy statement by those proposing it. The Supreme Court held that jurisdic-
tion to grant rescission or damages did exist, and remanded the case to the district court.
"[T]rial on the merits of the remanded case began in June 1969, and is still in progress."
Elson, The Meaning of J.1. Case Co. v. Borak-Remedies Available for Violations of
Proxy Rules under the Federal Securities Act, 23 Sw. L.J. 609, 610 n.2 (1969).
7. 377 U.S. at 431.
8. Id. at 430-31.
9. Id. at 433-35.
10. Id. at 434.
11. Id. at 431-33. The Court quoted from the House and Senate Reports on the 1934
Act. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934). For discussion of the Congressional purpose, see pp. 121-23 infra.
12. 377 U.S. at 432. The Borak decision received substantial attention from commen-
tators. In addition to the article by Elson, cited supra note 6, see the Comments and Notes
in 64 CoLum. L. REv. 1336 (1964); -78 HARv. L. REv. 296 (1964); 50 CORNEL. L.Q. 370 (1965);
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a causal relation between the solicitation materials and the effected
transaction was required in order to hold a defendant liable, but de-
clined to discuss the matter, stating that the question was one of fact
to be resolved at trial.13 Subsequent cases proceeded to discuss liability
in terms of causation, though in a conflicting fashion that created
abundant confusion.' 4
In this historical context, the Supreme Court decided Mills v. Elec-
tric Auto-Lite Co.15 Plaintiffs in Mills, shareholders of Electric Auto-
lite Co., sued to set aside a merger of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler
Linotype Co. and sought other appropriate relief for an alleged viola-
tion of Section 14(a)16 and Rule 14a-9.7 Plaintiffs claimed that the
proxy statement concealed the fact that all the Auto-Lite directors
were under the control of Mergenthaler and so were not in a position
to render an impartial opinion on the desirability of the merger.' 8
12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1150 (1965); 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 454 (1968). See also 5 L. Loss,
SECUiuTiES REGULATION 2879-2883 (Supp. to 2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as L. Loss].
13. 377 U.S. at 431.
14. See the survey offered in 5 L. Loss, supra note 12, at 2933-39. The inconclusiveness
of these decisions was enough to prompt Professor Loss to state that it was "apparent that
causation has now become the critical question in this area." Id. at 2933.
15. 396 US. 375 (1970).
16. See note 2 supra.
17. See note 3 supra. According to the complaint, Mergenthaler owned 54% of Auto-
Lite's outstanding common stock. Plaintiffs alleged that the proxy statement was misleading
because it told Auto-Lite shareholders that their board of directors recommended approval
of the merger without also informing them that all eleven of Auto-Lite's directors were
under the "control and domination of Mergenthaler." 396 U.S. at 378. Through the proxy
solicitation, Auto-Lite secured the necessary two-thirds majority, and the merger went
through in 1963.
18. Citing Borak, the Mills district court, 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Il. 1967), held that
summary judgment imposing liability should be granted. The district court agreed that
plaintiffs had standing to sue for retrospective relief, and held that their motion for sum-
mary judgment as to liability should be granted because a causal relation did exist between
the misleading proxy statement and the approval of the merger. The court appeared to
reach this conclusion on the curious ground that the merger of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler
created a conglomerate "inherently dangerous to a healthy economy." Id. at 831. This
reasoning seems irrelevant to the existence of a causal relation between violation and
transaction. The district court first considered the more plausible "transactional function"
test proposed by Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), application
for leave to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) denied, [1966-67 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REr. 91,846 at 95,900 (2d Cir. 1966), but then refused to apply it, asserting
that "Borak implies a different approach." 281 F. Supp. at 830. See also Record, Appendix
to Respondents' Brief, vol. III, at 909-11, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970). The Laurenzano case is further discussed at pp. 112-14, 116 and note 49 infra.
The Court of Appeals, 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), reversed. It maintained that there
was still "an issue for trial" with regard to causation because defendants had "presented
evidentiary material tending to show that the merger has merit and the terms were in fact
fair and equitable to the minority shareholders." Id. at 435-36. The court asserted that if
a transaction had been fair, then it was not "caused" by the proxy violation. The court
apparently assumed that shareholders would vote to approve a fair transaction even if
there were no deception; it reasoned, therefore, that in such a case a proxy violation could
not be said to be a "cause" of the shareholders voting the way they did. This conclusion,
however, does not necessarily follow. For the fairness of a transaction and the existence of
a causal relationship between a proxy violation and the completion of the transaction are
essentially separate questions. Otherwise, an anomalous situation would result: a proxy
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The Supreme Court held that in these circumstances the proper test
of causation, and hence of liability, was "materiality." A "material"
misstatement or omission in a proxy statement was characterized as one
which "might have been considered important by a reasonable share-
holder who was in the process of deciding how to vote."' 9 The Court
stated:
There is no need to supplement this requirement [of materiality],
as did the Court of Appeals, with a requirement of proof of whether
the defect actually had a decisive effect on the voting. Where there
has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a suffi-
cient showing of causal relationship between the violation and the
injury for which he seeks redress if, as here, he proves that the
proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the so-
licitation materials,was an essential link in the accomplishment of
the transaction.20
While retaining a good deal of language about "causation" and "causal
requirement," 21 the Court eliminated the need for proof of any causal
relationship and in effect substituted a presumption of causation in
favor of a plaintiff when both a material misstatement or omission and
the need for non-management votes had been established. This pre-
violation would "cause" a sale of assets if the price were unfairly low, but it would not
"cause" the sale if the corporation were able to secure a few more dollars and thus re-
ceive the fair value of the assets. See Appellees' Brief at 49-50, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968).
The Supreme Court, 396 U.S. 375 (1970), vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remanded the case for further proceedings. It rejected the "fairness of the merger"
test employed by the Court of Appeals for three reasons: (a) such a test would insulate
from private redress proxy violations not related to the terms of the merger; (b) it would
inhibit private enforcement of the proxy regulations because of the shareholder's difficulty
in obtaining sufficient data to prove unfairness; and (c) it embodied the dubious behavioral
assumption that shareholders will always vote for a fair merger. Id. at 382-83. (The third
reason is mentioned only in the footnote at 382-83.) Writing for the majority, Justice
Harlan stressed the importance of the first two reasons by stating that the "fairness of the
merger" test would frustrate the Congressional policies behind the 1934 Act. Id. at 383.
He echoed Borak by calling attention to the House and Senate Reports on the 1934 Act,
which contain the fullest statement of the Congressional purpose of providing fair cor-
porate suffrage and protecting the investor. Id. at 381. The policies of fair corporate suf-
frage and investor protection evinced by these Reports are further discussed at pp. 121-23
infra.
19. Id. at 384. For other views on the nature of materiality, see note 129 infra.
20. Id. at 384-85.
21. See, e.g., id. at 377 ("causal relationship'), 383 ("causation problem"), 385 n.7
("causation'). The Court speaks explicitly of a "causation requirement," id. at 385 n.7,
and begins its opinion by stating that "[t]he question with which we must deal is what
causal relationship must be shown between [a misleading proxy] statement and the merger
to establish a cause of action based on the violation of the Act." Id. at 377. It is also worth
noting that, although the Court in general followed the Government's brief closely, it did
not accept the Government's apparent view that a causal relation is dispensable. See Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-10, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970). A recent case decided in light of Mills, Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079
(S.D.N,Y. 1970), also speaks in terms of "causal connection." 310 F. Supp. at 1087.
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sumption 22 may be stated as follows: if the proxy statement contains a
"material" defect and if at least some votes must be obtained from
minority shareholders for a transaction to be approved, 28 then a "suffi-
cient showing"2 4 has been made of a causal relation between the defec-
tive proxy statement and the effected transaction to entitle the plaintiff
to some relief, even if only litigation expenses and reasonable attor-
neys' fees.25 However, as noted, Mills26 explicitly left open the ques-
tion of whether the existence of a causal relationship and hence of
liability could be shown where management employed a materially
misleading proxy statement but controlled a sufficient number of
shares to approve the transaction without any votes from the minority.2 7
Two conflicting interpretations have emerged from the lower federal
court decisions treating the question of liability for proxy violations
when management controls. 28 One line of decision, represented by Bar-
nett v. Anaconda Go.,20 holds that no causal relationship between the
22. As to the rebuttability of the Mills presumption, see pp. 135-38 infra.
23. The factual situation in Mills was that management controlled 54% of the voting
stock, yet needed 662% to effect the transaction. Whether certain language in the opinion
invites a broader reading will be considered later. See p. 123 infra,
24. 396 U.S. at 385.
25. This may appear slightly different from Justice Harlan's statement quoted earlier
in the paragraph insofar as it substitutes "effected transaction" for "injury for which he
seeks redress." From other remarks in the opinion, it would seem that "effected trans-
action" more accurately captures the Court's meaning. For example, it is said at one point
that "[o]ur conclusion that petitioners have established their case by showing that proxies
necessary to approval of the merger were obtained by means of a materially misleading
solicitation" implies nothing about the form of relief. Id. at 386 (emphasis added). Com-
pare the phrase from Borak, "causal relationship of the proxy material and the merger."
377 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added). It is sometimes important to distinguish between "ef-
fected transaction" and "injury for which plaintiff seeks redress." See pp. 123-30 infra.
26, On June 4, 1970, the Seventh Circuit, on remand, modified the judgment of the
district court so as to vacate the order appointing a special master and affirmed the judg-
ment as modified. It specifically stated that the judgment of the district court as to liability
"must be affirmed." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., Civil Action Nos. 16613, 16614 (7th
Cir., June 4, 1970), at 1, At this time, therefore, Mills is on remand to the district court
for determination of the appropriate relief.
Mills has been cited as controlling in Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill.
1970), and Colonial Realty Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chemical Co., [1969-70 Transfer
Binder] CCH FD. SEc. L. REP. 92,640 at 98,850 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
27. 396 U.S. at 385 n.7. A distinguishable but related question arises when management
and a shareholder who claims it would have voted in identical fashion despite the violation
jointly own a controlling block of shares. See pp. 135-$8 infra.
28. The conflict is recognized by Justice Harlan in Mills. 396 U.S. at 385 n.7.
29. 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). For other cases, see Adair v. Schneider, 293 F, Supp.
393 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Laufer v. Stranahan, [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FM. SEC, L.
REP. 92,617 at 98,773 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501,
506 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and cases cited in note 33 infra. None of the later cases has sig-
nificantly amplified the discussion contained in Barnett. In Adair v. Schneider the court,
in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, of want
of causation, agreed that Laurenzano could be read to the contrary, but simply said that
it preferred "the reasoning and the results of Barnett." 293 F. Supp. at 396. In Laufer v.
Stranahan the court denied rescission of a merger where defendants owned 85% of the
stock on, among others, the ground of lack of causation. It conceded that the question
involved was left open by Mills and that Laurenzano indicated one possible answer. But
il
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proxy material and shareholder approval or consummation of the trans-
action is possible when management controls. In this case, the plain-
tiff shareholder brought suit under Section 14(a) 30 for injury allegedly
due to misleading proxy statements sent out in connection with a sale
of assets. 31 Defendant Anaconda Co. moved for dismissal3 2 on the
ground that it owned 73% of the stock of the company in which plain-
tiff was a shareholder and that only a two-thirds vote was needed to
approve the transaction. The court granted the motion:
Here there is no question as to causal relationship between the
proxy material and the transactions under attack. The "but for"
element-the element of causation-does not and, indeed, could
not exist. The transactions under attack did not result from the is-
suance of the allegedly misleading proxy material which, in view
of the affirmative and concededly true allegation as to Anaconda's
73% stockholdings, could not have had anything to do with the ap-
proval and consummation of such transactions 3
Under the Barnett rationale, then, such a proxy violation is not held
to be a "but for" cause of the transaction, since the transaction could
have been effected, even if there had been no violation, when manage-
ment had voted all its shares in favor of the transaction.
A second line of decision, however, exemplified by Laurenzano v.
Einbender3 4 has taken a very different position from Barnett. Plain-
it stated that "in the absence of binding authority to the contrary, this court prefers to
adhere to the requirement of causation adopted by a number of judges in this district."
[1969-7 0 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. Sac. L. Rm. 92,617 at 98,775. The court probably
did not wholly subscribe to Barnett, as one passage indicated that plaintiffs might still re-
cover for any injury which they themselves suffered. See note 80 infra. But the opinion
still appears confused. The court seems to imply that there was no material misstatement
or omission at 98,774 and 98,775. If so, it is hard to see how plaintiffs could have had any
cause of action under the 1934 Act. Perhaps the only way of making the court's opinion
consistent is to say that its reference to absence of material misstatement or omission applies
only in respect of the remedy of rescission. This is admittedly tortuous.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964). Plaintiff included claims under Section 17(a) of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(d) (1964), and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
31. The suit was instituted against Anaconda Co. and Anaconda Wire and Cable Co.
(Wire and Cable). Plaintiff, a shareholder of Wire and Cable, alleged that defendants sent
out misleading proxy statements and that Wire and Cable was injured by a transaction in
which all its assets were conveyed to Wireco, Inc., a subsidiary of Anaconda.
32. The motion was made under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
33. 238 F. Supp. at 771. The rationale employed in Barnett has been cited with approval
in Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (defendants' motion for summary
judgment as to claim under Section 20(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 granted
on the ground that the minimum "but for" requirement of causation was unsatisfied); and
Robbins v. Banner Industries, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (defendant's mo-
tion for dismissal granted, on the ground that there is "no cause of action under sec-
tion 14(a) where the transaction complained of could not have resulted from proxies").
See also Textron, Inc. v. American Woolen Co., 122 F. Supp. 305, 307-08 (D. Mass. 1954);
Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341, 342-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); and cases cited in note 20 supra.
34. 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y.), application for leave to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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tiffs in Laurenzano, who were shareholders in Retail Centers of the
Americas, Inc. brought suit against National Industries, Inc. and mul-
tiple individual defendants for violations of Sections 10(b) and 14(a)
of the 1934 Act. They alleged that defendants employed materially
false and misleading proxy statements in submitting certain transac-
tions for shareholder approval and that the assets of Retail were un-
fairly depleted as a result of the transactions. They further claimed
that the defective proxy materials concealed improprieties which, if
known, would have "inhibited the defendant directors from approving
the transactions"5 and that these proxy materials were responsible for
the shareholders' failure to seek an injunction and for the dismissal of
their suit in state court.36 Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground
that the alleged proxy violations could not have caused the approval
of the transactions, since National controlled Retail and therefore
could have approved them by itself.
The court denied the motion but considered irrelevant plaintiffs'
contentions regarding injunctive relief and dismissal of the earlier
suit:
The misstatements and their effects, it would appear, should be
related to the corporate context in which proxy material functions
as such and not to the outer range of their effect on the resort to
legal remedies.3
7
Instead, the court interpreted Borak to impose liability for proxy vio-
lations even in situations when management controlled enough votes
to approve a transaction if the proxy material had a "transactional
function." 38 Although the court did not explain in detail its notion of
a "transactional function," it suggested, by way of illustration, that de-
fendants might have been seeking the shareholder consensus that
resulted (95% of the shareholders voted in favor of the transactions)
and might have acted differently had there been no such consen-
sus. The court reasoned that shareholder consensus may be of consider-
§ 1292(b) denied, [1966-67 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SE . L. REI,. 91,846 at 95,900 (2d
Cir. 1966). In denying a petition for rehearing of application of leave to appeal, the Court
of Appeals said: "By this denial we do not intend to approve or disapprove the legal merits
of the decision below or the decision in Barnett v. Anaconda Company . . ." [1966-67
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,846 at 95,900 (2d Cir. 1967).
35. 264 F. Supp. at 361.
36. Plaintiffs' theory here was that a truthful proxy statement "would have begotten
prompt injunction suits [and] assured the joinder of stockholders owning $50,000 of stock
in the state court suit"-thus making a security bond (the lack of which was the basis for
dismissal) unnecessary. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 360.
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able importance and that a proxy statement calculated to secure such
consensus may play a role in the approval of subsequent corporate
transactions or be of value to management in other ways.39
II. Imposing Liability When Management Controls
Even when it has control, management may, for legal or practical
reasons, solicit proxies.40 A solicitation requirement may be imposed
by stock exchange rule4 1 or by federal statute.42 Furthermore, many
corporations, acting under state corporation laws, may set up addi-
tional solicitation requirements in their certificates of incorporation
or by-laws.43 Once management does solicit proxies, further rules ap-
ply.4 4 Moreover, as a strategic matter, management may wish to solicit
proxies to give shareholders a sense of participation and thereby fore-
stall litigation over projected corporate action. It may also wish to pre-
vent the exercise of appraisal rights (which might drain the corpora-
tion's liquid assets) by securing shareholder approval4 5 in order to
retain sufficient cash to make the merger desirable to the other cor-
poration.
In situations where management possesses control there are, of
course, substantial reasons for allowing it freedom to act without
fear of shareholder suits. A management group that owns a controlling
interest in a corporation will not be likely to act contrary to the
interests of that corporation. Its own interests will be tied closely
to those of the corporation, and it will usually stand to lose financially
39. Laurenzano has been referred to favorably in a recent case under Rule lOb-5.
Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff,
266 F. Supp. 524, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Laurenzano figured more importantly in Swanson v.
American Consumer Industries, Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969). See p. 121 infra.
40. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 n.7 (1970).
41. N.Y.S.E. COMPANY MANUAL, A-134 (February 15, 1968); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE
COMPANY GUIDE § 705 (April 15, 1968). In regard to judicial enforcement, see Note, Private
Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 HARV. L. REv. 825 (1970).
42. Section 14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964). Section 14 and rules thereunder
apply to proxy solicitations with respect to shares registered under Section 12, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(1) (1964) (i.e., listed shares and shares of any company having more than 500 share-
holders and S1,000,000 in assets). See Rule 14a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (1970).
43. See, e.g., the broad means granted jointly by 8 DE.. CODE ANN. §§ 102(b)(1) and
(4), 109(b), 212, 215(b) and (c), 216, 241(a), 242(a) (1953, Cum. Supp. Pamph. 1968). See
generally O'Neal, Molding the Corporate Form to Particular Business Situations: Optional
Charter Clauses, 10 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1956).
44. For stock exchange rules, see NEv YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CONSTITUTION AND RULES,
Rules 450 to 460, at 3805-3815 (January 2, 1968); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY
GUmE, Rules 186, 574-585, at §§ 720-732 (April 15, 1968). Under federal law, see 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14a-l-240.14f-1 (1970). As to whether Mills would countenance relief if manage-
ment is able to circumvent the solicitation process, see Folk, Corporation Law Develop.
ments-1969, 56 VA. L. REv. 755, 821-22 (1970).
45. See pp. 116-20 infra.
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if the stock of the corporation suffers a decline in value. Furthermore,
shareholder derivative suits may injure the corporation, since even
frivolous suits are expensive to defend and the cost of defending them
must ultimately be borne by the corporation. Finally, freedom from
frivolous suits will enable management to act quickly in the corpora-
tion's interests when business opportunities arise. Nevertheless, there
may be situations in which management's actions in the proxy solicita-
tion process harm unduly the interests of minority shareholders.
A. Types of Injury
When management controls, a corporation may sustain a variety of
injuries from a defective proxy statement. Most importantly, such a
statement may be employed to conceal waste of corporate assets or to
mask self-dealing by the directors. Although in many cases there will
be no procedural bar to bringing a derivative suit in a state court when
such injuries occur, plaintiffs may well prefer a federal forum because
of the advantages of federal jurisdiction,46 and they may secure federal
jurisdiction for this derivative suit under the federal proxy rules.
Similarly, individual shareholders may suffer significant injury. The
most obvious harm occurs when the terms of the transaction (e.g., the
provisions relating to the exchange ratio in a merger contract) decrease
the value of the shareholder's holdings. 47 Using generally accepted ac-
46. Many bencfits of federal jurisdiction (e.g., liberalized discovery and class action
rules) are commonly recognized. A recent article states:
Federal courts have become more willing to take jurisdiction in suits against cor-
porations. In the past, many such cases would have gone into state courts, where,
lawyers say, the plaintiff doesn't stand as good a chance. For example, Federal courts
have more liberal "discovery" rules that permit the plaintiff to extract information
from the defendant corporation. Also helping to generate suits is "Rule 23" of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Issued in 1966 by the Supreme Court, the Rule
permits class actions by certain plaintiffs, including those bringing suits under the
securities law. In a class action, one person can sue on behalf of a whole group in
the same category.
"Getting Even-Some Unhappy Investors Try to Recoup Losses by Suing Firms, Broker,"
Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1970, at 23, col. 1.
47. More complicated types of shareholder injury are possible when the shareholder
is itself a corporation. Suppose that Corporation A has acquired 25% of Corporation B's
stock and has made a tender offer to B's minority shareholders in order to gain some
measure of influence on the operation of Corporation B. To destroy the tender offer, the
directors of Corporation B, who own a controlling number of shares, hurriedly negotiate
a merger with A's principal competitor, Corporation C, in which they employ proxy state-
ments depicting the desirability of the merger in a materially misleading fashion. Since
Corporation A may be subject to suit for an antitrust violation if it does not immediately
sell a large block of its stock in the new merged corporation, it may have to divest itself
of these shares so precipitously as to suffer a great capital loss and/or to be subjected to
suit under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act for an illegal coupling of a purchase and sale
within six months. Corporation A has thus been directly injured via its status as a Cor-
poration B shareholder by the misleading proxy statement which induced the merger
between B and C. (A pattern of injury rather close to this hypothetical was alleged in
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counting principles, plaintiff would attempt to show that the contract
did not afford him an adequate number of shares of stock in the sur-
viving or new corporation for the shares he surrendered in the now
merged corporation. This sort of injury is often inflicted by a manage-
ment which deceives minority shareholders, causing them to lose their
statutory appraisal rights (thereby depriving them of the chance to re-
ceive payment in cash from the corporation for the fair value of their
stock) and thus locking them into the surviving or new corporation. 4
B. Preclusion of Remedies and Causation
The holding in Laurenzano that management control should not
preclude liability is sound, even though the court failed to define ade-
quately its concepts of "consensus" and "transactional function," and
incorrectly dismissed the idea that preclusion of legal remedies is im-
portant.49 Control of sufficient votes to approve a transaction may not
indicate definitively that the transaction would have been consum-
mated had there been no deception. For management may use a ma-
terially deceptive proxy statement in at least two ways to ensure the
satisfactory completion of whatever action is before the shareholders
and to thwart counterthrusts by a dissident minority.
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 91 S. Ct.
41 (1970). See Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant in the Court of Appeals at 42-43.)
48. For further discussion of appraisal rights, see pp. 117-18 infra.
49. It has already been noted that the court considered irrelevant the fact that a mis-
representation in a proxy statement might deceive shareholders and thus prevent them
from resorting to their legal remedies. 264 F. Supp. at 361; see p. 113 supra. "Consensus"
in Laurenzano can therefore not be defined in terms of precluding resort to legal remedies,
since if a particular state of affairs (e.g., deterrence of litigation) has no relevance, it is
hard to see how any consensus tending to produce that state of affairs is relevant either.
Nor does the court make any reference to the use of publicity by dissident shareholders.
The value of "consensus," in the meaning that word must bear in Laurenzano, would
thus seem limited to whatever general harmony it might produce in the business life of
the corporation. But if that is what is meant, then it is difficult to explain exactly what
this general corporate harmony is. This difficulty appears to be acknowledged by the
Laurenzano court when it refers to the proxies obtained as "seemingly pointless approba-
tions." 264 F. Supp. at 361. The court does, indeed, suggest that such "have their uses"
and that a "record of disclosure itself may serve a range of useful purposes" (id.). but it
offers no examples. If "uses" and "purposes" refer to the discouragement of shareholder
suits, or to the obtention of evidence of shareholder approval should there be a suit, it is
clear that the proxy solicitation would have an extremely important role. See, e.g., Honig-
man v. Green Giant Co., 208 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963). "The trial court properly attaches significance to
the vote of the Class B stockholder. It states: '[T]he Court cannot ignore the persuasive
fact that the holders of 92.3 per cent of all outstanding Class B stock concluded that the
plan was fair to them and likewise so to the corporation.'" 309 F.2d at 671, quoting from
208 F. Supp. at 762. But any such interpretation is precluded by the fact that the notion of
"consensus" in Laurenzano excludes reference to the impact of a violation on the ability
of shareholders to resort to their legal remedies. Since the court's notion of "transactional
function" is founded on its debilitated concept of "consensus," it is clear that "trans-
actional function" as explained in Laurenzano is an altogether too tenuous basis for man-
agement liability.
116
Vol. 80: 107, 1970
Private Actions for Proxy Violations
First, the deception may have precluded publicity which a minority
could have used to block the transaction. By hypothesis, the misleading
statement or omission was "material," and the minority was thus kept
in the dark about something important enough to affect the vote of a
reasonable man. The shareholders might have been able to prevent
completion of the transaction by waging a public campaign to drama-
tize the transaction's undesirable character. For example, a group of
dissident shareholders might have taken a series of advertisements in
major newspapers across the country to apprise fellow minority share-
holders of what was taking place. These advertisements might have in-
fluenced the shareholders of the other corporation, the customers of
both corporations involved in the merger, and the general public. A
group of minority shareholders might also have used a series of press
conferences and radio-television broadcasts to mobilize public opinion
against management.50 Although the combined vote of all the minority
shareholders would not be enough to stop the transaction, the un-
favorable publicity ensuing from the revelation of the facts manage-
ment had concealed might have deterred management from conclud-
ing the transaction for fear of damage to its reputation, credit standing,
or business image.
Second, the defective proxy statement kept from the minority share-
holders the fact that the transaction was objectionable or harmful to
the best interest of the corporation or its shareholders; this deception
may have prevented them from resorting to one or both of the follow-
ing legal remedies in an attempt to block the transaction.
(a) In a merger context, appraisal rights might have been exercised.
Under many state statutes a shareholder of either of the merged cor-
porations has a right to appraisal of his stock and payment for it in
cash if he does not wish to own stock in the new or surviving corpora-
tion. The exercise of such rights would enable any particular share-
50. It should be observed that the use of publicity may be regarded as a "solicitation"
under Rule 14a-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-1 (1970). See Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry. Co., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (distribution of brokerage firm report held to
be a solicitation). But cf. Brown v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co., 328 F.2d 122
(7th Cir. 1964) (newspaper advertisement held not to be a solicitation where its purpose is
to inform and motivate the public and not to obtain proxies). If means of gaining pub-
licity are held to be solicitations, there may, quite apart from any materially misleading
statements or omissions, be a violation of Rule 14a-3 on the part of the minority share-
holders. This Rule provides in part:
(a) No solicitation subject to . . . [this regulation] shall be made unless each person
solicited is concurrently furnished or has previously been furnished with a written
proxy statement containing the information specified in Schedule 14A.
17 C.F.R. 240.14a-3 (1970). See generally W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
312-16 (4th ed. unabridged 1969).
117
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 80: 107, 1970
holder to salvage the worth of his personal holdings. Furthermore, ex-
ercise of appraisal rights by a large number of minority shareholders
might so drain cash assets from the corporation as to make the pro-
jected merger no longer feasible or, at least, desirable; indeed, many
merger plans expressly provide for termination if a certain percentage
of shareholders exercise or take steps to exercise appraisal rights. 15
However, such rights may often be lost if the shareholder fails to vote
against the merger,52 or fails to file a written objection to the transac-
tion before the shareholders' meeting (even though he votes against
the merger).53 The Illinois appraisal statute, for example, would ap-
pear to be unavailable to any shareholder who voted for the merger. 54
If appraisal rights have been lost, a shareholder will usually be pre-
vented by state law from contesting the fairness of a corporate agree-
ment by suing management for damages. 5
(b) Injunctions or declaratory judgments might have been sought.
A minority shareholder might have had two separate grounds for this
relief. (i) If plaintiff had been aware of the proxy violation before the
shareholders' meeting, he might have been able to block the transac-
tion by obtaining an injunction against the holding of that meeting
or the voting of any proxies, under either federal or state law, because
the proxies were secured by a materially defective proxy statement.50
51. See, e.g., Article IX(c)(4) of the plan of merger between Cerro Corp. and Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., Proxy Statement of Cerro Corp., December 27, 1967, at 4 (4% limitation);
Article IX(c)(4) of the plan of merger between MCA Inc. and Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
Proxy Statement of MCA Inc., September 20, 1968, at 6 (10% limitation).
52. See notes 53-55 infra. Such rights are dearly lost if the plaintiff shareholder votes
in favor of the merger. Boston & Maine R.R. v. Graham, 179 Mass. 62, 60 NE. 405 (1901).
53. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 262(b) (1969 Cum. Pocket Part) (except for a "short
form" merger, in which case § 253 applies); McKINNEY'S N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 623 (1963).
54. See 32 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 157.73 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1970). See also SEC v. National
Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969). "[B]y voting in favor of the merger, each approv-
ing shareholder individually lost any right under Arizona law to obtain an appraisal for
his stock and payment for it in cash." (See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-347 (1956).)
55. See the distict court's opinion in the Swanson case, 288 F. Supp. 60, 64 (S.D. Ill.
1968), and Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant in the Court of Appeals, at 12, 415 F.2d 1326 (7th
Cir. 1969). But see Opelka v. Quincy Memorial Bridge Co., 335 Ill. App. 402, 82 N.E.2d 184
(1948); Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, 347 Ill. App. 261, 106 N.E.2d 848 (1952). See also May
v. Midwest Refining Co., 121 F.2d 431, 438 (1st Cir. 1941); Victor Broadcasting v. Mahurin,
236 Ark. 196, 365 S.W.2d 265 (1963); Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 306 N.Y. 58,
115 N.E.2d 652 (1953). For the state of the law in Illinois, see generally Squires, The
Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy under Business Corporation Act, 53 ILL. BAR. J,
482 (1965); Wildman, Unwilling Shareholder in an Acquisition, 49 OHi. BAR Rac. 287 (1968).
56. There is a wide variety of injunctive relief available. See, e.g., Henwood v. SEC,
298 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962) (injunction postponing share.
holders' meeting); Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966) (injunction
prohibiting state court action and restraining the use of stockholders' authority to inspect
list of shareholders); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 226 F. Supp. 400
(N.D. Ill. 1964) (injunction forbidding use of proxies obtained by false or misleading
statements); Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Products Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966)
(injunction requiring supplementation or correction of proxy materials). See generally 2
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He might also have sought a declaratory judgment that the approval
of a given proposal involved a materially defective proxy statement
and that it would be illegal for management to complete the transac-
tion.57
(ii) The violation might have prevented the shareholder from ob-
taining injunctive relief based on a violation of state law that had been
concealed. If a proxy statement discloses waste of corporate assets, or
self-dealing on the part of the directors, or a conflict of interest, or any
other violation of state law, a court applying state law5s would be en-
titled to grant an injunction provided that the additional conditions
demanded by equity (such as irreparable injury) are satisfied.59 In Sea-
grave Corp. v. Mount,60 the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of an
injunction against a proposed purchase of stock on the ground that a
conflict of interest under state law was revealed by the proxy state-
ment.(' Hence, if the deceptive proxy covered a substantial violation
of state law, the shareholder might have been deprived of a chance to
have the voting enjoined; in such a situation, management control
L. Loss, supra note 12, at 956-73 (2d ed. 1962), 5 id., at 2925-2949 (Supp. to 2d ed. 1969);
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 470-73, 481-95 (2d
ed. 1968).
57. See, e.g., Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 216 (6th Cir. 1961). See
also Central Foundry Co. v. Gondelman, 166 F. Supp. 429, 446 (S.D.N.Y.), modified sub
nom. SEC v. Central Foundry Co., 167 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
The proxy statement would not merely mask wrongdoing unrelated to the proxy rules
but also conceal the materially defective character of the proxy statement itself, and thus
preclude connective action under these rules.
58. There are certain problems concerning jurisdiction and the conflict of laws in this
area, but these may be ignored for present purposes. See L. Loss & E. CowErT, BLUE SKY
LAw 181-244 (1958); Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L. R.v. 1249
(1960).
59. See cases cited note 56 supra and notes 60-62 infra. See generally 4 J. POMEROY,
A TREATIsE ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1338, 1359-1359a (5th ed. S. Symons 1941).
60. 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954).
61. The case was a stockholders' derivative suit brought to enjoin the Seagrave Corp.
and its officers from carrying out a proposed purchase of all the common stock and 95%
of the preferred stock of the Fyr-Fyter Company. In exchange for this stock Seagrave
was to authorize and issue to Herbert A. Post, Inc. (a concern owned by one man-Wetzel
-and itself the predominant stockholder in Fyr-Fyter) enough shares of Seagrave to give
Post (Wetzel) control. In an ancillary agreement, Wetzel was to buy out the controlling
Seagrave shareholders (the "Wilkes group") at a price per share that was one-third in
excess of its current market price. Proxies were solicited and the transaction was approved
by a majority of the Seagrave stockholders, counting the Wilkes group shares. The district
court granted an injunction against carrying out the plan on the ground that the trans-
action was unfair and the proxy statement materially misleading. The Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, concluded that the transaction was safely within the business judgment rule and
that the proxy statement adequately disclosed the plan. Nevertheless, it affirmed the
granting of the injunction on the ground that a breach of the duty of loyalty to the
corporation under state law was revealed:
Although good faith ... and disclosure of the material facts eliminate the question
of actual fraud, equity will still act to enforce the fiduciary obligation under circum-
stances amounting to constructive fraud. Constructive fraud refers to acts which may
have been done in good faith, with no purpose to harm the corporation, but which
are done by one who has placed himself in a position of conflict between a fiduciary
obligation and his own private interests.
212 F.2d at 397. For discussion of the case, see W. CARY, supra note 50, at 650-52.
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would be irrelevant to a minority shareholder's chances of securing an
injunction. 62
If the minority shareholder is claiming that the proxy deception cov-
ered up a violation of state law sufficient in itself to support a state
court injunction, the shareholder might also argue that the deception
"caused" his injury by preventing him from persuading other minority
shareholders to join him as plaintiffs. Some states have statutes provid-
ing that, absent the joinder of shareholders owning a certain amount
of stock, the shareholders bringing the derivative suit must post a se-
curity bond against the litigation expenses of the corporation should
the derivative suit fail. 63 Plaintiffs in Laurenzano, for example, argued
that they had been injured by management's deceptive proxy state-
ment because their state court derivative suit had been dismissed for
lack of a security bond. 4 Plaintiffs might therefore claim that if the
proxy statement had fully disclosed the facts, they would have had no
difficulty in obtaining the joinder of sufficient stock interest to make
a security bond unnecessary.
By preventing adverse publicity and by precluding recourse to avail-
able legal remedies, a deceptive proxy statement might, therefore, have
played a crucial role in the completion of the proposed corporate ven-
ture. In some situations, it may thus be appropriate to speak of the
proxy violation as the "but for" cause of the transaction, 5 even where
management possesses the requisite voting power. 6
62. It may also be noted that, even where there is no statement or omission which is
materially misleading under either federal or state law, plaintiff might still obtain aninjunction under state law on other grounds. See, e.g., Steinberg v. American Bantam
Car Co., 76 F. Supp. 426, 441 (W.D. Pa. 1948), appeal dismissed as moot, 173 F.2d 179
(3d Cir. 1949) (evidence that fraud or violence would be used at meeting); Ohrbach v.
Kirkeby, 3 App. Div. 2d 269, 161 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1957) (same); Bryan v. Western Pac. R.R.
Co., 28 Del. Ch. 13, 35 A.2d 909 (1944) (inadequate notice of meeting); Nationwide Corp.
v. Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 87 N.W.2d 671 (1958) (insufficient
time for use of shareholder list by insurgents); Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563,
134 A.2d 852 (1957) (proxies solicited in violation of ruling that directors sought to be
ousted should have sufficient time to present their case).
63. See generally 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CoRPORATIoN LAW AND PRACTICE § 722 (1959). Ten
states had such requirements in 1968. Id., 1968 Pocket Part, at 111-15.
64. See note 36 supra.
65. Traditionally, X is said to be a cause in fact of an event only if the event would
not have occurred but for X. This is the so-called "but for" test of causation. W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 241 (3d ed. 1964). "Proximate cause" or "legal cause," on the other hand,
is "essentially a problem of law." Id. at 282. Only if a defendant's conduct is the proximate
cause of an injury may he be held liable. Normally, the proximate cause must also be a
"but for" cause, but not all causes in fact are considered legal causes. The indispensable
conditions of a given injury may be myriad, but the law will usually consider only one
or perhaps several of these to be the legal or "proximate" cause or causes. (It is doubtful
that any definite rule can be developed for determining proximate cause, as complicated
issues of legal policy and theory are involved. For a survey of proposed formulae, see
PROSSER at 284-88.)
66. As to the standard of proof in this situation, see pp. 125-27 infra. For occasions
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Hence, it is clear that the court's view of causation in Barnett is en-
tirely too crude to be accurate in many factual situations.67 In Swanson
v. American Consumer Industries,s a recent case under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that application of
the Barnett rationale "would .. . sanction all manner of fraud and
overreaching in the fortuitous circumstance that a controlling share-
holder exists" 6 because injury could still be inflicted upon minority
shareholders:
Unlike Barnett, in the present case the minority shareholders
were entitled to appraisal rights under Illinois law. It may well be
that the misstatements and omissions contained in the proxy state-
ments caused some Peoria shareholders to approve the sale, thus
losing their statutory remedies. Other minority shareholders who
failed to vote for or against the plan may nevertheless have been
lulled into sleeping on their dissenters' rights.70
C. Implementation of Policies Behind the 1934 Act
If, even with management control, a proxy violation may be the
cause in fact of injury to the corporation or its shareholders, then it is
necessary to consider the policies behind federal regulation of proxy
statements to determine whether it should sometimes also be consid-
ered the proximate cause of that injury and hence serve as a basis for
management liability. The 1933 and 1934 Acts were the result of the
stock market crash of 1929, the investigations of the securities market
when management may have reason to solicit proxies even though it controls, see p. 114
supra.
67. "It is probable that the reason the defendant directors in Barnett tried to deceive
the minority, whose votes they did not need, was to keep them from contesting their acts,
which the court assumed to be illegal under state law. Since the plan could not have been
successful but for this ancillary deception of the minority shareholders, that deception
can be considered one of the causes in fact of the corporate injury." Comment, Sfhare-
holders' Derivative Suit to Enforce a Corporate Right of Action Against Directors under
SEC Rule 10b-5, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 578, 582 (1966). It should be observed that the Govern-
ment's brief in the Mills case, which was in general followed closely by the Court, appears
to favor Laurenzano over Barnett. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14
nn.13 & 14, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
68. 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969). Plaintiff, a shareholder of Peoria Service Co. (Peoria),
objected to a plan whereby Peoria's assets were to be transferred to American Consumer
Industries (ACI) for ACI stock. He alleged that Peoria's proxy statements were materially
misleading, that the reorganization plan was unfair to Peoria, and that some Peoria
shareholders approved the plan because of the misleading proxy statements, thereby
losing their statutory appraisal rights. (32 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 157.73 (Smith-Hurd, 1970
Pocket Part) was in question here. See the district court's opinion in the Swanson case,
288 F. Supp. 60, 64 (S.D. Ill. 1968).) Although ACI owned 90% of the U.S. Cold Storage
Corp., which in turn owned 87% of Peoria, the court rejected ACI's putative defense of
lack of causation between violation and transaction because injury might still have re-
sulted from the violation.
69. Id. at 1331.
70. Id. (emphasis added). Laurenzano was cited.
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which followed, and the general failure of state regulation in this
area.71 The proponents of the new federal Acts sought to prevent
fraudulent and misleading transactions and to give the investor greater
understanding of his investments by shedding on corporate affairs the
"white light of publicity." 72 Against this background, it is clear that
the purveying of materially misleading statements is inconsistent with
the two major policies which stand behind the regulation of proxies
by the 1934 Act.1 3 First, the policy of fair corporate suffrage stresses
the value of clear and sufficient explanation to the shareholder of all
projected action for which proxies may be sought.74 Informed and in-
telligent voting is thus an important goal, particularly where the pres-
ervation of appraisal rights is at stake. Since a minority shareholder
may take a variety of actions, both to preserve his own interests and to
protect those of the corporation, this ideal of accurate, complete infor-
mation is as important when management controls as when it does not.
Second, the policy of protecting the investor and insuring him redress
when his rights have been violated is applicable in all situations where
materially misleading statements or omissions have been employed to
deprive the shareholder of his legal remedies and of other opportuni-
ties for action (such as use of publicity).75 Since even in the case of
71. See Hanna & Turlington, Protection of the Public under the Securities Exchange
Act, 21 VA. L. Rav. 251, 252 (1935); Legislation, Federal Regulation of Securities: Some
Problems of Civil Liability, 48 HARV. L. Rv. 107, 108 (1934). See generally Tracy & Mac-
Chesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1931, 32 Min. L. REv. 1025 (1934).
72. 78 CoNG. REc. 7925 (1934). See also Hanna & Turlington, supra note 71, at 276;
Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 71, at 1047-49, 1055; Comment, Civil Liability for
Misstatements in Documents Filed under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44
YALE L.J. 456, 457 (1935).
73. These policies are stressed in both Borah and Mills. See p. 108 and note 18 supra.
74. The Senate Report on the 1934 Act noted that "[t]oo often proxies are solicited
without explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for which
authority to cast his vote is sought." S. RP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
The Report urges that "he be enlightened not only as to the financial condition of the
corporation, but also as to the major questions of policy, which are decided at stock-
holders' meetings." Id. Similarly, the House Report contended that "[flair corporate
suffrage is an important right that should attach to every security bought on a public
exchange." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). For cases stressing the
importance of full disclosure, see, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,589 at 98,685, 98,687 (3d Cir. 1970).
75. In this connection the House Report spoke of the use of proxies obtained without
full disclosure "to take from the stockholders for their [insiders'] own selfish advantages
valuable property rights." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934). And in
discussing liability for misleading statements imposed by § 18 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r
(1964), the Senate Report remarked on the inadequacy of criminal penalties under state
laws as the "sole sanction" for preventing "the exploitation of the investor." S. REP. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). It went on to argue that "if an investor has suffered
loss by reason of illicit practices, it is equitable that he should be allowed to recover
damages from the guilty party." Id. See also the section entitled "Minority Views" in the
House Report. H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1934). Since Borah and Mills
it has become clear that civil liability is to attach to proxy violations as well, and that the
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management control the shareholder may be precluded from exercising
his rights and availing himself of the full range of his opportunities to
influence corporate decision-making, this policy likewise serves to jus-
tify liability.
D. Consistency with Mills
The foregoing argument for management liability is, moreover, con-
sonant with the Mills case, the latest Supreme Court decision interpret-
ing the proxy regulations. In Mills, of course, some votes were needed
from minority shareholders to effect the transaction. But the principle
expressed by the Court that a causal relationship has been shown if the
proxy solicitation was an "essential link '76 in the accomplishment of
the transaction may be interpreted more broadly. If proxies are solic-
ited to discourage shareholder suits and use of publicity and to obtain
evidence of shareholder approval, that solicitation should be regarded
as an "essential link" in the accomplishment of the transaction. This
is particularly so where a requirement exists that proxies be sought.77
It would, therefore, appear that the argument for management lia-
bility presented above finds support in the language of the Mills
opinion.78
III. Patterns of Causal Connection
A. Definitions and Standard of Proof
If liability is to be imposed in situations when management controls
the votes necessary to complete a transaction, the concept of "causa-
tion" in this context must be greatly clarified. Some courts imply that
the proxy violation must cause the transaction; others suggest that it
must cause the injury to the corporation or shareholder; and still
others mingle "transaction" and "injury" with seeming indifference.79
While it is generally settled that there must be some causal connection
between violation and injury for a defendant to be held liable, it is not
shareholder is a valuable adjunct to the SEC in bringing misdeeds to light. See J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-33 (1964); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
381 (1970). See p. 108 supra.
76. 396 US. at 385. The passage is quoted in full at p. 110 supra.
77. See p. 114 supra.
78. "Thus, as the supreme Court obliquely indicated in Mills, the causation require-
ment, and more specifically the 'essential link' test, could probably be met in this situation
(of management control] if proxies are solicited through misleading statements or omis-
sions." Folk, supra note 44, at 820-21 (footnote omitted).
79. See the cases discussed in note 80 infra.
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settled whether a causal relation must also exist between violation and
transaction. This confusion frequently makes it difficult to harmonize
past decisions under Section 14.80
Terms must be clearly defined if the different patterns of causation
which may be involved in private actions are to be understood. "Viola-
tion" will here mean management's use of a proxy statement which is
materially defective under the current Mills standard. A "transaction"
will be defined as any corporate action for which proxies are sought
(e.g., a merger). "Injury" will mean any pecuniary harm suffered by
the corporation (e.g., waste of its assets) or by shareholders (e.g., decrease
in value of stock holdings because of an inadequate merger exchange
ratio).
If "cause" is taken in the general sense of "cause in fact," i.e., A is
the "cause" of B if B would not have occurred but for A,," it is clear
that a proxy violation can function as a "cause" in two ways. On the
80. There are a number of passages in both Borak and Mills which suggest that a
causal relation between violation and transaction is essential. "But the causal relationship
of the proxy material and the merger are questions of fact to be resolved at trial, not here.'
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (emphasis added). "The question with which
we deal is what causal relationship must be shown between such a statement [i.e., a
"materially false or misleading" proxy statement] and the merger to establish a cause of
action based on the violation of the Act." Mills. v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
377 (1970) (emphasis added). Similarly: "Our conclusion that petitioners have established
their case by showing that proxies necessary to the approval of the merger were obtained
by means of a materially misleading solicitation implies nothing about the form of relief
to which they are entitled." Id. at 386 (emphasis added). But cf. the passage in which the
Court states "Where there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a
sufficient showing of a causal relationship between the violation and the injury for which
he seeks redress if . . ." Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
The court in Robbins v. Banner Industries, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), con-
strued Barnett to require a causal connection between violation and transaction.
In Barnett .. Judge Bryan held that there was no cause of action under section
14(a) where the transaction complained of could not have resulted from proxies.
Id. at 762 (emphasis added). But it can be argued that Barnett is far from clear on this
issue, since the court states at one point:
In the case at bar the necessary causal cannection between the alleged violation of
section 14(a) and the alleged injury to the minority shareholders is wholly lacking.
238 F. Supp. at 773 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, language can be found in most of the cases to suggest that only the
relation between violation and injury is important, at least where dissolution of the trans-
action is not sought. For example, in Laufer v. Stranahan, [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,617 at 98,773 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court was prepared to follow
Barnett to a point, and denied rescission where defendants owned 85% of the stock on,
inter alia, the ground of lack of causation. However, the court refused to say that a causal
connection between violation and transaction is in all circumstances necessary to state a
cause of action under Section 14(a):
What has been said is not intended to permit a dismissal of the action, but only so
much of it as seeks rescission of the merger. The plaintiffs will be permitted to show
what impairment of stockholding interest, if any, resulted from the merger, as distinct
from the alleged corporate misstatement. If they have been injured by the merger in
this sense they should be able to pursue their claims for damages or other appropriate
relief.
Id. at 98,775. See also note 29 supra.
81. See note 65 supra.
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one hand, a violation may cause injury, though there will often be an
intermediate step. Thus, a materially misleading proxy statement may
in the first instance be causally responsible for a shareholder's loss of
appraisal rights by inducing him to vote for a merger; this loss of ap-
praisal rights may, in turn, be causally responsible for the decreased
value of a shareholder's stock, since, but for that loss, he would have
been able to receive the fair cash value of his holdings by exercising
those rights. On the other hand, a violation may be said to cause the
transaction. The defective proxy statement may preclude resort to
publicity and legal remedies; that preclusion may in turn be consid-
ered the "cause" of the transaction, since, if the proxy statement had
not prevented the use of publicity or legal remedies, the employment
of these "corrective" devices might have deterred management from
completing the transaction.
A finding of "causation" necessarily entails application of a standard
of proof to determine whether there is a causal link between violation
and injury and/or between violation and transaction. The applicable
standard should be one of preponderance of the evidence, i.e., it must
appear more likely than not that the necessary causal relation existed.
When plaintiffs are attempting to establish a causal link between
the proxy violation and the injury they have suffered, the fact of a ma-
terial misstatement or omission under Mills means that, had plaintiff
known of the true state of affairs, he might have voted differently. In
this case, such a vote (against, rather than for, a proposed merger)
would have enabled plaintiff to preserve his appraisal rights and avoid
financial injury. Where the plaintiff is claiming injury from loss of ap-
praisal rights, the existence of a material violation will usually imply
that it is "more likely than not" that a causal relation existed between
violation and this injury.8 2
For example, assume that a merger was negotiated between Corpora-
tion A and Corporation B, whereby A shareholders would receive one
share of the stock of B (the surviving corporation) for each share of A
stock. However, A's directors sent out a misleading proxy statement,
which they used to conceal the fact that on generally accepted account-
ing principles the fair exchange ratio was two shares of B stock for
each share of A stock. The A shareholders voted in favor of the merger,
thereby losing their appraisal rights, and later found out that their
holdings had been diminished in value by one-half. A Section 14(a)
82. For preservation of appraisal rights would allow plaintiff to exercise them once he
learned of the injury.
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suit brought by A shareholders under the theory of this Note should
nearly always be successful; for it would be most unusual for the
trier of the fact to find that it was not more likely than not that
they would have exercised their appraisal rights and thus avoided in-
jury had they known of the unfair exchange ratio. Indeed, the only
practical difference between application of the standard of preponder-
ance of the evidence and the imposition of per se liability in this case
after a finding of materiality is that the former allows, while the latter
does not, the unlikely introduction by management of an admission
or a declaration against interest made by a plaintiff A shareholder to
the effect that he would not have exercised his appraisal rights.
In other cases, plaintiffs seeking rescission of a transaction will be
attempting to establish a causal link between the violation and the
transaction. To prevail they must make it appear more likely than not
both that they would have taken action of a certain type or types and
that management would have been deterred from consummating the
transaction by virtue of that action.
An example may serve to make this notion of causation clearer.83
Suppose that a proxy statement materially misrepresented the fairness
of a merger exchange ratio between Corporations A and B, but that
the ratio was inadequate by only $.50 per share of A stock."" The A di-
rectors controlled 95% of the A stock; the remaining 5%, amounting
to 50,000 shares, was distributed equally among fifty shareholders.
Various other factors in the corporate context, such as the fact that
B's assets were extremely valuable (owing to a short-term dislocation
between supply and demand in favor of sellers) and could be used by
A, indicated that the merger was very important to both corporations.
The fifty A shareholders now demand rescission, alleging that they
would have exercised appraisal rights and used publicity to block the
transaction. In this case, the trier of the fact would find that no causal
connection existed between violation and transaction. In the first
place, a mere fifty shareholders, with only $500 apiece to lose, are un-
likely to resort to publicity on a scale that would influence manage-
ment. Secondly, even if all fifty were to have exercised their appraisal
rights, it is doubtful that the net effect would have been sufficient to
dissuade management from pursuing the important merger. Plaintiffs
would therefore not be able to meet the test of preponderance of the
evidence.
83. For further discussion, see pp. 128-29 infra.
84. A and B stock were both listed securities. Hence, the federal proxy regulations
were applicable. See note 42 supra.
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Nevertheless, as the relevant variables are altered in favor of the
shareholders, it is clear that the existence of a causal link between vio-
lation and transaction becomes more likely. Thus if the above example
were modified by positing an exchange ratio inadequate by a margin
of $3.00 per share of A stock, or by increasing the number of shares of
A stock in the hands of minority shareholders, or by diminishing the
importance of the merger to management, or by some combination of
these changes, plaintiffs would stand a much better chance of proving
that it was more likely than not that a causal link between violation
and transaction existed.
In general, therefore, to show a causal relation between violation
and injury plaintiff must make it appear more likely than not that, had
there been no misleading proxy statement, he would have been able to
take steps sufficient to protect himself or the corporation from injury.
To prove that such a relation exists between violation and transaction,
he must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, but for the viola-
tion and the preclusion of publicity and/or legal remedies, the transac-
tion would not have been consummated. In this context, the dual im-
pact of appraisal rights should be noted. Insofar as appraisal rights are
exercised by any particular shareholder, they serve to protect him from
injury; insofar as they are exercised en masse, they may dissuade man-
agement from consummating the transaction.
In accordance with this definition of terms and analysis of standard
of proof, four possible causal patterns can be distinguished.
B. The Four Patterns
1. Violation causes both transaction and injury. If a violation causes
both transaction and injury, plaintiff should be entitled to both dam-
ages for the harm suffered and (possibly) rescission of the transaction.8 5
Suppose, for example, in regard to a proposed merger between Corpo-
rations A and B, A's directors misrepresented in a proxy statement the
fairness of the exchange ratio: A shareholders were in fact short-
changed $20 per share of A stock. There were 10,000 A shareholders
with a total of 1,000,000 shares of stock, and the merger would not
have been feasible if cash assets had been depleted. In these circum-
stances, the trier of the fact must certainly find that the violation both
caused the injury (decrease in value of individual stock holdings), be-
cause A shareholders would probably have exercised appraisal rights,
85. As to punitive damages, see pp. 130-34 infra.
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and caused the transaction (merger), because wholesale exercise of ap-
praisal rights would have drained the corporation's liquid assets and
made the merger financially undesirable. In accordance with the argu-
ment presented for liability above, once the violation is shown to
"cause" both the injury and the transaction, management should be
held liable for the injury sustained by the plaintiff, and rescission is a
possible form of relief.86
2. Violation causes injury but not transaction. If plaintiff proves that
the violation caused the injury but fails to prove that it caused the
transaction, he should be entitled to damages but not rescission.87 The
most obvious example of this causal pattern is when plaintiff suffers a
limited loss in the value of his stock holdings, but neither the loss itself
nor the amount of stock not under management control is very signifi-
cant. Such an example was given earlier,88 viz., the case where a ma-
86. It should be noted that, even if there is a causal relation between violation and
transaction, it does not follow that rescission must be granted. Before granting rescission
and/or damages, the court should consider at least the following factors. (1) Time elapsed.
In some cases the passage of several years after the consummation of the transaction, par-
ticularly in the case of mergers, will itself make rescission inappropriate or impossible, since
the acquired company may have lost its employees, good will, and very identity. Elson,
supra note 6, at 619-20. (2) Nature of the transaction and parties. A merger, for instance,
is obviously more difficult to undo than most transactions. Again, it is easier to return
conveyed assets to an extant corporation than to a corporation that has been dissolved
subsequent to the transaction but before relief could be decreed.
(3) Fairness of the transaction. If the transaction has in the eyes of the court been fair
to the corporations involved, and only an ancillary wrong (e.g., conflict of interest, as in
Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1954); see pp. 119-20 supra) detected, that
would be a reason for not granting rescission. See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1970); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-16, 18-19,
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra. (4) Shareholder preference. If the overwhelming
majority of the shareholders were satisfied with an unfair transaction, that would afford
some reason for awarding only monetary relief. See, in regard to Mills, Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Supplemental Summary Judgment at 26-27, Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (affidavits by other Auto-Lite
shareholders attesting to their satisfaction with the merger); Respondents' Brief at 34,
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-16, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 875 (1970). For case support, see, e.g., Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co.,
144 F. 765 (1906), 199 F. 64 (1912), 203 F. 945 (8th Cir. 1913). Conversely, even if the
transaction was fair, some case for rescission could probably be made where the share-
holders oppose that transaction. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
13 n.12, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
(5) Delay. If plaintiff is aware of the violation before the shareholders' meeting but
chooses not to seek an injunction, or in other situations fails to bring suit soon after
discovering the violation, rescission should perhaps be withheld. See Walpert v. Bart, 280
F. Supp. 1006, 1017 (D. Md. 1967). (6) Intervention of innocent third parties. If a violation
of the proxy regulations is not discovered until a merger or some other transaction involv-
ing third parties has been completed, the court must be careful not to award relief affecting
adversely the interests of innocent third parties (e.g., post-merger purchasers of the new
corporation's stock who were unaware of the deceptive proxy statement). For this reason
it will often be imperative that the transaction not be rescinded. See Walpert v. Bart, supra;
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
87. As to punitive damages, see pp. 130-34 infra.
88. See p. 126 supra.
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terially defective proxy statement was sent out in connection with a
merger, but the exchange ratio was inadequate by only $.50 per share
and a mere 50,000 shares (5%) were not under management control.
It was seen that the trier of fact must in those circumstances find
that there was no causal connection between violation and transaction.
But there was such a connection between violation and injury, since
plaintiffs would more probably than not have preserved their appraisal
rights by voting against the merger.
In such circumstances, it is necessary to ascertain the type of relief
sought by the plaintiff. The absence of a causal link between violation
and transaction seems irrelevant to whether plaintiff should be allowed
to recover damages for the injury inflicted upon him. If defendant's
illegal conduct (the violation) is the cause in fact of plaintiff's injury
(e.g., the decrease in value of stock holdings because of an unfair
merger exchange ratio and loss of appraisal rights), that would under
standard tort principles be sufficient to hold defendant liable.8 9 How-
ever, if plaintiff sues for rescission of the transaction, the failure to
prove that the transaction itself is causally linked to the violation
should negative granting that form of relief since the interests of in-
nocent third parties (e.g., post-merger purchasers of the merged corpo-
ration's stock) may be adversely affected by any dissolution of the
transactionY0
3. Violation causes neither transaction nor injury. If plaintiff is able
to show only the bare fact of a violation and cannot prove that the vio-
lation caused either the transaction or the injury, then he should be
entitled to neither damages nor rescission. 91 As an example, suppose
that mangement recommended a merger to the shareholders, but that
the terms of the merger were fair under general accounting principles
and that neither shareholders nor the corporation suffered injury.
However, management materially misrepresented its relation to Cor-
poration B (e.g., they were all the nominees of Corporation B, which
owned the controlling interest in Corporation A). The publicity value
of that revelation (it will be assumed) is small. Here the trier of the
fact will find that the violation was not causally responsible for any
injury, since there was none. Similarly, he will find no causal relation
between violation and transaction because exercise of appraisal rights
89. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946);
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). See also PROSSER, supra note 65, at 191-93.
90. For additional requirements in regard to rescission, see note 86 supra.
91. In regard to punitive damages see pp. 130-34 inlra.
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would have had no deterrent effect (since the terms were fair and so
there was no reason for minority shareholders to exercise their ap-
praisal rights), plaintiffs would not have been able to get an injunction
(since they could not have shown irreparable injury), and the use of
publicity would have been unavailing.
4. Violation causes transaction but not injury. If the violation causes
the transaction but no injury, plaintiff is generally, under the theory
advanced in this Note, entitled to no relief. In rare instances, punitive
damages may be awarded. Suppose that Corporation A negotiated a
merger with Corporation B, and that A's directors recommended ap-
proval to the shareholders. The exchange ratio proposed was entirely
adequate, and there were no problems concerning waste of assets or
conflict of interest. However, the A directors materially omitted from
the proxy statement the fact, known to them and to the B directors but
not to the general public, that Corporation B had just signed a large
contract for the production of war materiel with the government of a
foreign state. The war being waged by the foreign state was extremely
unpopular with American citizens; had the existence of this contract
been known to the minority A shareholders, they could have used pub-
licity to force management to withdraw from the proposed transaction.
It seems apparent that the trier of fact must find that the proxy viola-
tion caused no injury to A shareholders (since they have suffered none)
but did cause the transaction.
This case may arise infrequently, but when it does it will pose con-
siderable difficulties. Since neither plaintiff nor the corporation has
suffered injury as a result of the violation, it is apparent that there is
no basis on which to award actual damages. For the purpose of actual
damages is to compensate for loss proximately resulting from the de-
fendant's conduct, and here there is no such loss. Nevertheless, it is
important to consider whether, because the violation caused the trans-
action, plaintiff should recover punitive damages. 92
At common law, punitive or exemplary damages were sometimes
awarded 93 on theories of revenge, indignation,94 punishment or deter-
92. Punitive damages are, of course, arguably a remedy in the case of the first three
causal patterns as well, and the discussion of punitive damages here should be understood
to apply also to the earlier examples.
93. See, e.g., Livesey v. Stock, 208 Cal. 315, 281 P. 70 (1929); Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298
Ill. 192, 131 N.E. 675 (1921); Williams v. Benson, 87 Kan. 421, 124 P. 531 (1912); Pickle
v. Page, 225 App. Div. 454, 233 N.Y.S. 461 (Sup. Ct. 1929). For their recognition in federal
courts, see, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 US. 58 (1897).
94. See, e.g., Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and
Mary, 262 N.Y. 320, 324-25, 186 N.E. 798, 800 (1933).
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rence. 5 Such damages are generally allowable only where there has
been malicious, wanton, or oppressive misconduct,96 and most cases
hold that both the amount 7 of such damages, and indeed whether
they are to be given at all,98 rest in the jury's discretion.99
The question'"0 here is whether they should be allowed for viola-
tions of Section 14 of the 1934 Act. Although there are no cases under
Section 14 on point, the question of punitive damages has been dis-
cussed in regard to other claims under the 1934 Act and also in regard
to claims under the Securities Act of 1933. Those cases are not in com-
plete harmony. Most of the decisions in the early 1960's concluded that
punitive damages were not allowable under either the 1933 Act or the
1934 Act, 1 1 and this line of interpretation has since been reinforced
by Green v. Wolf Corp.02 and Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.0 3
The argument against punitive damages under the 1934 Act, as enun-
ciated in Green, was that Section 28(a) 0 4 of the Act clearly pre-
cluded punitive damages by limiting damages awarded in any suit per-
95. See, e.g., Funk v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa. 18, 70 A. 953 (1908).
96. See, e.g., Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va. 578, 104 S.E. 800 (1920); Pullman Co. v.
Pulliam, 187 Ky. 213, 218 S.W. 1005 (1920); Hobbs v. Smith, 27 Okla. 830, 115 P. 847 (1911).
97. See, e.g., Ford v. McAnally, 182 N.C. 419, 109 S.E. 91 (1921).
98. See, e.g., Bergman v. Jones, 94 N.Y. 51 (1883).
99. For general treatment of punitive damages, see C. McCoRmIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAw oF DAMAGES §§ 77-85 (1935); H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY §§ 269-
76 (rev. ed. 1961); 1 T. SEDGwIcx, A TREATISE ON THE MEAsuRE OF DAMAGES §§ 347-88 (9th
ed. 1912).
100. This question can arise when there is actual harm as well as when there is not,
and the discussion in the text is intended to apply to both cases. At common law, some
courts have held that there must be actual damage before punitive damages can be
awarded. See, e.g., Shore v. Shore, II1 Kan. 101, 205 P. 1027 (1922). But this rule is not
generally followed. See, e.g., Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 9 P.2d 505 (1932). See also
C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES § 83 (1935).
101. See, e.g., Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), af'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1963); Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 393 F.2d
864 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Note, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under
Rule lob-5, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 164 (1968). However, a few cases have held that rescissional
damages, i.e., damages equal to the amount by which defendant has wrongfully profited,
are not barred by Section 28(a). See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747-48 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786-87 (1st Cir. 1965);
Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968), modified on other grounds, 412 F.2d
571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970). These holdings weaken the "actual
damages" limitation of Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964), though
they do not go so far as to allow punitive damages. For reasons why rescissional and
punitive damages should be distinguished, see note 116 infra.
102. 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
103. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969) (reversing award of punitive damages under 1933 Act
by the district court), cert. denied, 397 US. 913 (1970).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964) reads in part: "The rights and remedies provided by
this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist
at law or in equity; but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the
provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more
actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained
of." Emphasis added.
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mitted under the Act to "actual damages."'105 In support of this conclu-
sion, the court contended that punitive damages are unnecessary as a
deterrent under Rule lOb-5, since liability for actual damage may be
very heavy,'0 6 and since the 1934 Act also contains provisions for crim-
inal penalties 0 7 The court asserted that the burden of punitive dam-
ages would "ultimately fall on all the stockholders, including mere in-
nocent pawns."' 08
Nevertheless, a number of very recent cases in the district courts
have rejected this reasoning,0 9 and have allowed punitive damages or
indicated them to be a possible form of relief. The most far reaching
of these decisions was deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.,110 which held
that the Section 28(a) "actual damages" limitation does not preclude
punitive damages,"' because it is applicable only to suits specifically
authorized by the Act; therefore, since implied causes of action-for
example, private actions under Section 10(b) or 14(a)-are not specifi-
cally authorized, Section 28(a) does not apply to them.
For two reasons, however, punitive damages must usually be rejected
as a justifiable form of relief under Section 14(a). First, although the
line of reasoning employed in deHaas has found some favor," 2 it seems
a departure from the language of Section 28(a). For that section does
not speak of actions "specifically authorized," but rather states that "no
person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions
of this chapter" shall recover more than "actual damages.""13 And it is
difficult to see how a private plaintiff seeking relief under Section 14(a)
105. 406 F.2d at 802-03. This reading would seem warranted by the legislative history.
"This subsection limits the total amount recoverable to the amount of actual damages."
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934).
106. The implications of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), should be sufficient to confirm that proposition.
107. Section 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1964).
108. 406 F.2d at 303.
109. See DeNeane v. McDonnell : Co., Inc., [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEc.
L. REP. 92,462 at 98,192 (D.D.C. 1969); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp.
647 (D. Colo. 1969); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 444 (N.D. Cal. 1968)
(dictum); Nagel v. Prescott & Co., 36 F.R.D. 445, 449 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (dictum). See also
Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 848 (E.D. Va. 1968).
110. 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969). The deHaas court explicitly refused to follow
Green and denied one defendant's motion to vacate a jury award of punitive damages
under Rule lob-5.
111. See Comment, The Availability of Punitive Damages for Express and Implied
Causes of Action under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
43 TMPLE L.Q. 140 (1970). See also Note, Punitive Damages in Implied Private Actions
for Fraud under the Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 646, 650 (1970).
112. In addition to the Comment and Note cited supra note 111, see A. BROMBERG,
SECuRrriEs LAW-FRAUD--SEC RuLE 10B-5 § 9.1, at 229 (1968); Comment, Private Remedies
Available under Rule lOb-3, 20 Sw. L.J. 620, 624 (1966); Note, Remedies for Private Parties
under Rule 10b-5, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rxv. 337, 338 (1969).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
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is not a person permitted to maintain such a suit." 4 Moreover, quite
apart from statutory construction, there is the fact that the Court
in Mills stated that "damages should be recoverable only to the extent
that they can be shown."'1 5 This statement would also seem to bar ex-
emplary damages under Section 14.116
Second, even if the courts could be persuaded that neither Section
28(a) nor Mills precludes punitive damages, policy considerations
rarely favor their award. Since Mills expressly allows costs and reason-
able attorneys' fees," 7 only "punitive damages" in a strictly noncom-
pensatory sense are in issue. Hence, the rationale that punitive dam-
ages help to defray the expenses of litigation is inapplicable." 8 Fur-
thermore, the retributive purpose which punitive damages allegedly
serve in other areas of the law may be fulfilled largely by the criminal
114. The rejoinder that "under the provisions of this chapter" refers only to actions
expressly created by the Act does not seem very persuasive. See also the legislative history
of § 28(a), note 105 supra. There is perhaps some ground for saying that an implied action
under Rule 10b-5 arises under common law tort principles rather than the provisions of
the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946);
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (ND. Cal. 1968); deHaas v. Empire Petro-
leum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969). But see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.s. 977 (1969). See generally Note, Securities Regulation-
Damages-The Possibility of Punitive Damages as a Remedy for a Violation of Rule lOb-5,
68 MICH. L. REv. 1608, 1610-18 (1970). However, there is little ground for the analogous
contention in regard to implied private actions for proxy violations: their basis in common
law, if any, is clearly much less strong than that of actions for fraud. Indeed, both .Borak
and Mills have treated private actions for proxy violations as being founded on a "federal
cause of action" authorized under Section 27 of the Act, and have allowed federal juris-
diction on that basis. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 428, 430-31 (1964); Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 377, 383 (1970).
115. 396 U.S. at 389.
116. Elson has argued, however, that if the courts will allow a rescissional measure of
damages, it is inconsistent for them not to allow punitive damages, for both may bring a
windfall to the plaintiff. Elson, supra note 6, at 617. The argument is a non sequitur, for
there would seem to be at least two differences between rescissional and punitive damages.
First, rescissional damages do bear some relation to the wrong committed in that they
represent the amount the wrongdoer has profited, while punitive damages bear no such
relation. Second, punitive damages are granted for some express purpose such as punish-
ment or revenge, whereas rescissional damages are often awarded simply because the court
must give the ill-gotten gains to someone and is reluctant to let the wrongdoer profit. "It
is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let
the fraudulent party keep them..,.. [I]t is simple equity that a wrongdoer should dis-
gorge his fraudulent enrichment." Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965).
Elson has also argued that decisions denying the award of punitive damages cannot be
reconciled with the holdings in Borak and SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453
(1969), because the "federal courts have broad discretion in shaping the relief necessary
and can specifically grant rescission-a remedy not specified in any of the provisions of
the 1934 Act," Elson, supra note 6, at 617. This argument is also unconvincing. In some
cases rescission may be the only way of returning matters to the status quo ante, and hence
could be argued to be the analogue of actual damages and so within the limits of § 28(a)
of the Act. Punitive damages are not even arguably within those limits.
117. 396 U.S. at 389-97.
118. Damages are here considered to be "compensatory" not only when they redress the
actual harm suffered by the plaintiff, but also when they provide recompense for expenses
incurred by the plaintiff in obtaining redress for actual harm.
133
The Yale Law Journal
penalties available under the 1934 Act."" In any case, retribution
seems apposite only where a defendant's conduct is particularly repre-
hensible. For example, if the president of the corporation knowingly
inserted false accounting data into the proxy statement in an effort to
conceal the true state of the corporation's finances and thereby to in-
sure the election of directors who would re-elect him president (and
would permit him to continue looting the corporation), punitive dam-
ages might be appropriate. By contrast, such damages would not have
a defensible retributive function if the defendant was an outside direc-
tor who had, by inadvertence, permitted the issuance of a deceptive
proxy statement. Finally, the only substantial reason for punitive
damages is the additional deterrence they would provide. In view of
the fact that liability for proxy violations may be quite high anyway
and that the precise deterrent effect of punitive damages is difficult to
estimate, this reason does not seem very convincing. The burden of
punitive damages may quite unfairly fall on innocent shareholders. 120
Although there is some evidence that juries can distinguish degrees of
reprehensibility among various wrongdoers, 121 and even though the
courts can restrain unwarranted or excessive awards,'122 it is doubtful
that the possibility of unfairness can be eliminated entirely. In sum-
mary, the arguments in favor of punitive damages at best support their
award in only a very limited number of cases. 123
119. Section 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1964).
120. Indemnification for punitive damages apparently is not, for example, precluded
by the Delaware indemnification statute. See 8 DE.L. CODE ANN. § 145 (Gum. Supp. Pamph.
1968).
121. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
rev'd as to award of punitive damages, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
913 (1970). The jury awarded punitive damages against Hoppenfeld, the president of Law
Research Service, and Blair & Co., Granbery, Marache Inc., the underwriter, but not against
Law Research itself. Compensatory damages were assessed against all defendants. The
evidence tended to show that Hoppenfeld and the underwriter were aware of defects in
the offering circular and failed to correct them, whereas officers and directors of Law Re-
search apart from Hoppenfeld were not aware of them.
122. See Comment, supra note 111, at 150-51; Note, The Imposition of Punishment by
Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1159, 1171 (1966).
123. Note, Punitive Damages in Implied Private Actions for Fraud under the Securities
Laws, 55 CORNELL L. RErv. 646 (1970), discusses the various arguments and concludes that
punitive damages may in some cases be justified. This conclusion appears to be restricted
to cases involving especially undesirable behavior under the fraud provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts.
A plaintiff's remedies in private actions under section 17(a) [of the 1933 Act] and
rule lob-5 [issued under the 1934 Act] are potent, but there are areas where addi-
tional punitive and deterrent devices are needed. Under proper procedures, punitive
damages awarded after an aggravated tort would serve a necessary function as an
extraordinary remedy.
Id. at 658-59 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
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IV. Rebuttability of the Mills Presumption
A related but distinguishable question of liability, also left unan-
swered by Mills, is whether a management which does not itself own a
controlling block of stock would be allowed to introduce evidence that
the requisite number of shareholders would have voted to approve the
transaction, despite the materially defective proxy statement. Here
management owns less than a controlling interest (i.e., the Mills situa-
tion), but would be able to produce in court testimony from sharehold-
ers (whose votes coupled with management would yield the necessary
total) that even had they known of the material defect they would have
voted in the same fashion. The question is whether the Mills presump-
tion (that materiality and the need of votes to approve a transaction is
sufficient for a showing of causation) may be rebutted. For example,
suppose that Corporation A controlled 59% of the voting stock of Cor-
poration B, and B's management (who had been appointed by A)
used a materially defective proxy statement to obtain the necessary
two-thirds vote of B shareholders to authorize a merger with A. All B
shareholders entitled to vote did so,124 and the result was 69% in favor
and 31% against the transaction. If a mutual fund holding 10% of the
B stock had voted all its shares for the merger, and if B's management
could prove that the mutual fund was not in fact misled and would
have voted the same way even had the proxy statement not been mate-
rially defective, 25 would this enable B's management to rebut the Mills
presumption of causal relation between violation and transaction?126
Although the Court did not confront this question in Mills, it might
be argued that, since Mills states that there is a "sufficient showing of
124. This supposition avoids certain problems raised by Heit v. Davis, [1964-66 Transfer
Binder] CCH F. SrEc. L. REP. 91,698 at 95,565 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Heit held that, where a
simple majority was needed to approve a transaction, defendants' motions for dismissal
and summary judgment in an action under section 14(a) must be denied, since, though
defendants accounted for 51.31% of the votes cast at the shareholders' meeting, they did
not have a majority of the shares outstanding. There was, in the eyes of the court, "no
mathematical demonstration of non-causality." Id. at 95,567.
125. Such proof might, for example, proceed by way of affidavits from directors or
officers of the mutual fund,
126. Since there is (1) a proxy violation and (2) the necessity for management to secure
votes from other shareholders to approve the merger, application of the Mills test yields
the result that a "sufficient showing" has been made.
The above question is said to be "related" to that posed at the beginning of this Note
because in a sense the practical issue is in each case the same-viz, whether management
is to be held liable when plaintiff's minority votes are unneeded. On a formal plane, how-
ever, the two questions are distinguishable. "Can causation be shown if management
controls?" asks whether a causal relation can be established if condition (2) of the Mills
presumption is unsatisfied, that is, if no minority votes are needed. "Can causation ever
be rebutted?" asks whether defendant can show a causal relation to be absent even if both
conditions of the Mills presumption are met.
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causal relationship 127 if some votes must be obtained from minority
shareholders and if there is a material misrepresentation, liability will
result here. However, this interpretation depends on reading "suffi-
cient" as "sufficient no matter what the circumstances," whereas there
is authority for construing "sufficient" to mean only that there is a
prima facie case.128 It would therefore be consistent to allow the in-
troduction of countervailing evidence. Moreover, reference to other
statements in the Mills opinion suggests that the Court had no such
rigid construction in mind. For example, the Court asserted that a
"material" defect is one which "might have been considered important
by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to
vote."'- 29 It is clear that a plaintiff does not have to prove the actual ef-
fect on himself of the material misrepresentation,'30 but it seems con-
sistent to allow a defendant to prove that the misrepresentation had
no effect on some minority shareholder other than plaintiff. Finally,
the Court does not use "per se" language or specifically state that the
presumption is irrebuttable.
It is evident, therefore, that the Mills opinion itself provides no clear
and final answer as to whether the presumption is rebuttable. A line of
decisions under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, however, provides an
analogy which suggests that the presumption is rebuttable. These de-
cisions hold that for a plaintiff to recover he must have "relied" on a ma-
terial misrepresentation. In the leading case, List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 31 plaintiff brought suit under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for
127. 396 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added).
128. See, e.g., Parker v. Overman, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 137, 141-42 (1855) ("sufficient" in
Arkansas statute is a synonym for "prima facie," not "conclusive"); State v. Newton, 33 Ark.
276, 284 (1878) ("sufficient" means "prima facie"). See also Rebel v. Standard Sanitary
Manufacturing Co., 340 Pa. 313, 318, 16 A.2d 534, 537 (1940), where "sufficient" as used in
statute was said to be "a relative term depending upon the facts of each case." Contra,
Spilman v. Gulf & S.I. R.R. Co., 173 Miss. 725, 731, 163 So. 445, 446 (1935): "In law, when
anything is said to be sufficient, it means that nothing else is required."
129. 396 U.S. at 384 (emphasis added). The nature of "materiality" has not been finally
settled. The definition just quoted from Mills is probably the most liberal and the most
authoritative. But the nature or definition of materiality formed one issue in Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 91 S.Ct. 41 (1970),
where plaintiff in petitioning for a writ of certiorari maintained that the Second Circuit
used too restrictive a definition of the word "material." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 9-17. For a sampling of the general confusion on the subject, see, e.g., SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Wayne Corp. v.
Dressex Industries, Inc., 383 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir. 1967); Electronic Specialty Co. v. Inter-
national Controls Corp., [1969-70 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. Rr'.P. 92,342 at
97,634 (2d Cir. 1969); Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970);
Gilbert v. Nixon, [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FEm. SEC. L. Rp. 92,625 at 98,810 (10th
Cir. 1970); Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FmD. SEC. L. RP.
92,637 at 98,839 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Krasik, Tender Offers: The Target Company's
Duty of Disclosure, 25 Bus. LAw. 455, 459 & n.24 (1970).
130. 396 U.S. at 384-85.
131. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nora. List v. Lerner, 381 U.S. 908 (1965).
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lost profits owing to allegedly wrongful non-disclosure by an insider
purchaser of his stock. In affirming the district court's dismissal of the
action, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was necessary to establish
both materiality of the non-disclosure and individual reliance and that
plaintiff had failed to prove either.132 As to the nature of reliance, the
court said:
The proper test is whether the plaintiff would have been influ-
enced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had dis-
closed to him the undisclosed fact.133
While there has been criticism of the requirement of reliance, 34 the
List "reliance" requirement is, however, merely a requirement of causa-
tion in fact; 3 5 proof is only required that the violation was actually
responsible for the conduct of those putatively affected. As one com-
mentator has declared:
It does seem proper to limit the defendant's liability to those
injuries which, but for his illegal conduct, would never have been
suffered. Any broader liability would be inconsistent with the pol-
icies thought to justify the imposition of civil liability in the first
place. 36
The present state of the law under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is
thus that, even if plaintiff can prove that a misstatement or omission
was materially misleading, he will have no case if the defendant can
prove that he would have acted no differently had there been no mis-
statement or omission. 37
If the reasoning of List is adhered to, proof that the materially mis-
leading statement had no effect on two-thirds of the voting stock will
rebut the Mills presumption of causation. In terms of the earlier hypo-
132. Thus, to the requirement that the individual plaintiff must have acted upon the
fact misrepresented [reliance] is added the parallel requirement that a reasonable man
would also have acted upon the fact misrepresented [materiality].
340 F.2d at 462 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
133. Id. at 463. Similarly, the later case of Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir.
1966), held that both materiality and reliance are required under Rule lOb-5, and that if a
plaintiff did not rely on a misrepresentation, he has no case. See also Vanderboom v.
Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178, 1192-93 (W.D. Ark. 1969).
134. Criticism rests primarily on the ground that the notion of relying on an omission
has seemed obscure or absurd. See, e.g., W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER
TRADING 109 (1968); Comment, Civil Liab'ility under Section 10B and Rule 103-5: A
Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YAr L.J. 658, 674 (1965).
135. A closer reading of the cases purporting to require reliance reveals that many
courts were actually referring to the concept of causation in fact.
Note, Insiders' Liability under Rule lOb-5 for the Illegal Purchase of Actively Traded
Securities, 78 YALE L.J. 864, 866 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
136. Id. at 866-67 (footnotes omitted).
137. See, e.g., Vanderboom v. Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Ark. 1969).
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thetical, while the misrepresentation was material, there was no "reli-
ance" on it by either management or the mutual fund. Thus, since
these two blocks of stock represent enough votes to effect the transac-
tion, if the List rationale is followed, the violation could not be said
to have "caused" the transaction solely on the strength of the Mills
presumption.
Even though the causal relationship countenanced by the Mills pre-
sumption may be rebuttable, however, it does not follow that a causal
relation may not be established in some other way. Even where the
Mills presumption is initially rebutted, as here when management
proves that the mutual fund's votes were not influenced by the viola-
tion, a plaintiff will still be able to prove that the violation was the
cause in fact of the consummated transaction where, if the true char-
acter of the transaction had been known, the consequences (e.g., whole-
sale exercise of appraisal rights, use of publicity, etc.) would more
probably than not have deterred management from effecting the
transaction. 3 8 Even where no causal relation exists between violation
and transaction, there may still be such a relation between the viola-
tion and injury to the minority shareholder 3 9 Hence, rebuttal of the
Mills presumption does not preclude all possibility of management
liability.
138. See pp. 116-21, 123-24, 126-27 supra.
139. See TAN pp. 116-21, 123-25, 128-29 supra.
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